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3A B S T R A C T
Nigeria is richly endowed with oil and gas resources, but the country’s continued reliance
on loans from international ﬁnancial institutions raises questions about the transparency
and accountability of its utilisation of the huge revenues resulting from these two
resources. In order to attract international capital to bolster its revenues from sales of oil
and gas, a huge proportion of which continues to be used corruptly, the World Bank has
encouraged the Nigerian government to subscribe to neoliberal economic policies by
enlisting accounting ﬁrms and privatising state-owned enterprises. Key justiﬁcations for
this have included enhancing accountability, reducing public-sector corruption, promoting
market efﬁciency and attracting international capital. However, this paper presents
evidence of the role of accounting in the undervaluation of assets, concealment of possible
malpractice, and subversion of the accountability that it should have delivered in the
privatisation process. The assumption that accounting will enhance accountability, reduce
public-sector corruption and promote market efﬁciency in privatisation, and ultimately
attract investment into a crony capitalist Nigerian state, appears to be an illusion created
partly through the apparent legitimacy of accounting.
ã 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, with an increasingly global capitalist economy, developing countries have been encouraged to adopt
neoliberal economic policies such as deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs; see United Nations, 1993; World Bank, 2005).1 These have
been perceived to be necessary in order to enable countries, particularly poor ones, to partake in the wealth and ﬁnancial
opportunities promised by neoliberalism (see UNCTAD, 2005). Financial support has often been contingent on, amongst
other things, the enlistment of accounting, on the grounds that this will create the necessary accountability in the national
ﬁnancial system to reduce public-sector corruption and enhance market efﬁciency. However, the drive to deploy accounting
for this purpose must be viewed alongside the fact that the outcomes of accounting-linked privatisation in developing
countries (Hawley, 2000; Uddin and Hopper, 2003), notably those of Africa (Andrews, 2013; Nellis, 2008), have often provedd Management, Queen Mary, University of London, 327 Mile End Road, London E1 4NS, UK.
. Bakre).
ort from powerful nations (led initially by the US and European members of the G7, now G8) and
rld Bank and the International Monetary Fund, developing countries were encouraged to employ
global accountancy ﬁrms) and to privatise as much and as fast as they could (see Baker, 2001).
. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
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YCPAC 1940 No. of Pages 14at best disappointing and at worst disastrous (Lassou & Hopper, 2015; Rahaman, Everett, & Neu, 2007). It has been
particularly questionable in countries in which cronyism is embedded within the socio-political, economic and cultural
systems and corruption is endemic, a scenario that has at some point characterisedmost African countries (Lassou &Hopper,
2015), including Nigeria. In fact, evidence from studies undertaken on privatisation from the 1990s onward suggests that
accounting practicesmaywell have complicated and negative consequences (seeMcSweeney, 2009; Sikka, 2015). In crony as
well as corrupt developing countries, such practices frequently undermine the espoused objectives of “accounting-led”
change (see Craig, 2007; Graham & Annisette, 2012; Lassou & Hopper, 2015; Rahaman et al., 2007; Uddin & Hopper, 2003).
Studies of both developed countries (Humphrey, Miller , & Scapen, 1993; Ogden, 1995; Shaoul, 1997) and developing
countries (Morales, Gendron, & Guenin-Paracini, 2014; Rahaman et al., 2007; Zhang , Andrew, & Rudkin, 2012) have
documented the contradictory impacts of accounting numbers, techniques and practices in promoting neoliberal market
reform policies, such as privatisation. For example, Shaoul (1997) has shown how accounting was used to justify the UK
Government’s claim that privatisation of water in England andWales would result in increased efﬁciency and beneﬁt every
citizen, and has identiﬁed gaps between the initial rhetoric and subsequent outcomes. Ogden (1995) has investigatedways in
which accounting numbers and information contributed to and shaped the process of organisational change in the ten
regional water authorities of England and Wales. Humphrey et al. (1993) have provided an incisive account of how
accounting agents, techniques and practices were enrolled to promote and legitimise Thatcher’s government privatisation
policies in the UK. As developing countries have also been encouraged to privatise, studies have found similar patterns of
contradiction. Lassou and Hopper (2015) have examined how the World Bank’s use of computerised accounting systems to
effect reforms and improve governance and accountability in a former French colony in Africa were frustrated by the weak
regulatory system and corrupt governance structure. Morales et al. (2014) have underlined the connection between
accounting, neoliberal governmentality and discursive activity. Their study highlights the roles of the media and political
actors in producing problematising trajectories that prevented the Greek ﬁnancial crisis from excessively destabilising the
spread of the neoliberal agenda of state privatisation. Zhang et al. (2012) have revealed how enhanced market efﬁciency,
which was supposedly to be achieved through the use of fair value accounting to implement reforms in China, became an
illusion created partly through the legitimacy of fair value accounting. Rahaman et al. (2007) have exposed the use of
accounting numbers, techniques and practices to legitimise perceived exploitation in water privatisation in Ghana. Uddin
and Hopper (2003) have shown that in privatisation in Bangladesh, as in other developing countries, accounting techniques
and practices have been used tomask the redistribution of power andwealth to the newelite andmultinational corporations
in a new capitalist setting.
While the above literature provides some useful insights into how accounting has been used to legitimise the perceived
exploitation of neoliberal privatisation, no previous study appears speciﬁcally to have examined the connections between
accounting and cronyism. Cronyism has become an immanent feature of contemporary capitalist economies, inwhich those
close to political policymakers and government ofﬁcials continue to seek close personal tieswith large corporations, and the
infusion of corrupt practices continues to strengthen the monopolistic power of large corporations. This is particularly
evident in developing countries such as Nigeria. This paper therefore highlights cronyism – a much neglected aspect of the
neoliberal agenda of state privatisation – in a cronyist developing-country context. Speciﬁcally, the paper examines how
accounting has been used to obscure cronyism inprivatisation in the Nigerian socio-political context. Nigeria is a nation state
whose ability to create wealth has been increasingly hampered by greed and moral indifference (Buhari, 2015), as well as a
lack of transparency and accountability in themanagement of its huge deposits of oil and gas resources (African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2008; Global Financial Integrity, 2013; Global Witness, 2010). Studies have noted that an ineffective regulatory
framework and weak audit and legal institutions have encouraged cronyism in the Nigerian socio-political and economic
system (Bakre, 2011; Madunagu, 2007; Mahmoud, 2006; Transparency International, 2014). Through the greed of a few
cronies (Buhari, 2015) and the unethical practices of accountants (Bakre, 2007), SOEs have been mismanaged and the
Nigerian commonwealth pillaged (Buhari, 2015).
In order to create transparency, accountability and market efﬁciency in the management of SOEs, the Nigerian
government embraced the World Bank’s encouragement to enlist accounting and privatise SOEs. However, in a cronyist
socio-political system, encouragement to privatise SOEs led to the mobilisation of accounting to conceal cronyism and
corruption in the privatisation process. This paper contributes to the literature theoretically and empirically by providing
evidence from the Nigerian socio-political and economic context. The evidence suggests that, as long as cronyism and other
corrupt interests are involved in the privatisation process, there will be a market for more or less legal proposals by
accounting and legal experts, enabling “workarounds” to accounting rules. This paper shows that accounting rules can be
ﬂouted in ways that indicate internal cronyism and corruption in the privatisation process.
The framing and presentation of the evidence is organised around sections discussing accounting and cronyism, the
research methods used, the socio-political context of accounting and cronyism, the empirical evidence, and fair value and
accountability in a crony capitalist developing state: myth or reality? It concludes with a summary and discussion.
2. Accounting and cronyism
Accounting as an information system, and auditing as amonitor or “check” on the accuracy of the accounting information
system, provide enormous potential to establish accountability and detect corrupt activities (Kimbro, 2002; p.336).
Accounting has been considered to be an essential instrument in the privatisation process (United Nations, 1993) and in thePlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2016.01.003
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described as a rational and unbiased estimate of the potential market price, which reﬂects and reinforces a “faithful
representation of reality” and enhances market efﬁciency in the global economy through better diffusion of real-time
information on objective asset and liability valuations (Boyer, 2007). In line with the concept of fair value accounting,
ﬁnancial regulatory bodies in both developed and developing countries have therefore required that assets and liabilities be
valued using fair value (FASB, 2006; Obuh, 2012). However, some have argued that accounting numbers, techniques and
practices have become technologies for legitimating the privatisation of SOEs in developed (McSweeney, 2009; Sikka, 2015)
and developing countries (Morales et al., 2014; Rahaman et al., 2007; Uddin & Hopper, 2003; Zhang et al., 2012).
Scholars have been actively involved in examining themobilisation of accounting to legitimise privatisation in developed
and developing countries. However, none have yet examined the use of accounting to obscure cronyism in the speciﬁc
context of crony capitalist developing countries such as Nigeria. Hawley (2000) notes that corruption has increased in such
countries as a result of encouragement or mandates from international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) and donor agencies for
countries to privatise. Malhotra (1998) observes that, under crony capitalist governments that are “secretive and lacking in
institutional capacity to regulate” and are already corrupt, “privatisation cannot possibly be the dream cure”. Indeed the
scope for corruption may greatly increase as a result of privatisation in this context, leading to costly and bad privatisation.
This has been greatly assisted by technologies such as accounting, which are often mobilised to conceal cronyism and
corruption in privatisation.
Modern states, and speciﬁcally crony capitalist states, are complicit in the development of markets (Kang, 2002). Using
accounting numbers, techniques and practices (Sikka, 2015), most markets are created, sustained or regulated through
political mechanisms (Manzetti, 2009). This poses a problem for the “faithful representation of reality” that fair value
accounting has promised to deliver through privatisation (Sikka, 2015), notably in crony capitalist states. Using accounting
numbers and information (Conrad & Sherer, 2001), crony capitalist states in particular decide which problems might
properly be allocated to market solutions, what parameters will govern market exchanges and who can be market players
(Malhotra, 1998). They also decide which accounting ﬁrms and techniques should be used to value assets and liabilities
(Craig & Amernic, 2006; Tangri & Mwenda, 2001). In this context, accounting often shapes and legitimises the decisions and
actions of mainly crony capitalist governments in establishing the valuation and market price of assets in ways that
encourage corruption. Sikka (2015) notes that “in legitimising economic reality, accounting becomes an exchanger, which
stabilises certain procedures, but simultaneously helps them to evolve”. In modern (and particularly crony capitalist) states,
fair value accounting may reinforce the illusion of an asset’s continued growth or distress by fuelling speculation of
importing upward or downward asset valuations into the balance sheet and then exporting those valuations through various
processes in which accounting is inﬂuential (McSweeney, 2009).
In crony capitalist societies, success depends on close relationships between government, business people and
government bureaucrats (Kang, 2002). There are few checks on government divestiture decisions, political leaders often
seek to divest to favour cronies, and the big offenders often evade justice (Tangri & Mwenda, 2001). In these circumstances,
accounting numbers, techniques and practices are often deployed tomask cronyism inmarket reforms such as privatisation,
so as to favour politically allied cronies and domestic ﬁrms. This is achieved by using the legitimacy of fair value and other
accounting practices to prevent or restrict out-of-favour domestic groups and foreigners from bidding on the most lucrative
SOEs. This often leads to favouritism in the distribution of legal permits, government grants, special tax breaks, and other
forms of state intervention. By mobilising fair value accounting to legitimise the undervaluation of assets (Craig & Amernic,
2006), crony capitalist elites win most bids through political connections (Tangri & Mwenda, 2001). With the validity of
accounting for proﬁt making (Shaoul, 1997), the elite buy undervalued assets at giveaway prices (Ojakaminor, 2007).
Through the legitimisation of accounting (Craig, 2007), cronyism may therefore create a tiny wealthy class of capitalists in
such countries (Stiglitz, 2002). This further suggests that accounting is not an innocent activity (McSweeney, 2009),
especially in crony capitalist societies such as Nigeria (Bakre, 2011).
As a modern neoliberal nation state, the Nigerian government has sought to stimulate private-sector wealth creation by
containing public spending, reducing direct taxation, relaxing regulation and privatising SOEs (see Obuh, 2012). Nigerian
companies have also sought to “re-engineer” their cost structures in a variety of ways, by delaying, outsourcing and
automating. Accounting numbers, measures, and regulations such as fair value have beenwidely adopted in re-engineering
cost structures as an apparently objective means of valuing and policing restructuring processes, as well as monitoring and
controlling market reform (see Obuh, 2012). However, fair value and other accounting practices, which were introduced to
enhance rational and unbiased estimates of market prices of assets, have instead been used to conceal cronyism in the
undervaluation and eventual transfer of undervalued assets to cronies at giveaway prices (see Senate Ad Hoc Committee on
Privatization, 2011). Although accounting rules promised to be neutral with respect to economic policy (United Nations,
1993), the use of fair value to cover up cronyism and redirect the proceeds of privatisation into private bank accounts
(Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, 2008) suggests that, in the Nigerian privatisation process,
accounting has been political. The promise that accounting would make enterprises governable and accountable according
to ﬁnancial facts (Miller & Rose,1990) has been held to be problematic in Nigerian privatisation (Elombah, 2003). The idea of
ensuring transparency and accountability in managing private enterprises through accounting has become questionable in
Nigerianprivatisation (Senate AdHoc Committee on Privatization, 2011). Nigeria’s newprivate owners have used accounting
techniques to pursue private capital accumulation at the expense of wealth creation and employment generation, with
ﬁnancial restructuring to bolster proﬁts at the expense of wealth redistribution (Anyanwu, 2009). This is known to havePlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2016.01.003
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the privatisation process and the post-privatisation management of entities in Nigeria, therefore, accounting numbers,
techniques and practices are regarded as part of the problem rather than the solution (Elombah, 2003), providing a further
indication of the political economy of accounting in Nigerian privatisation.
3. Research methods
For the analysis that follows, data were drawn from internal and external sources. Internal sources comprised a wide
range of archival materials, including those on the impact of graft (the act of taking illicit or unfair advantage of an ofﬁce for
personal gain), and institutional, academic and professional literature on privatisation in Nigeria. Reports by government
agencies constitutionallymandated to oversee the privatisation processwere examined.2 The study also examined reports of
the various investigatory panels commissioned by the Nigerian National Assembly (Committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives) in response to calls by Nigerians, donor agencies and IFIs, notably the World Bank, for the Nigerian
government to investigate the activities of some of the politicians and public ofﬁcials constitutionally appointed to oversee
the nation’s privatisation exercise.3 The roles played by accountancy institutions, professional accountancy bodies,
accounting ﬁrms and individual accountants were also examined4, and reports by agencies concerned with the control of
corruption in Nigeria were consulted.5 Starting from the return to democracy in 1999, particular attention was paid to the
privatisation process, as well as anti-corruption and National Assembly investigations into privatisation cases. As a result of
the Freedomof Information (FOI) Act, whichwas passed in 2011, reports of investigations by the National Assembly and anti-
corruption agencies were periodically made available to the public. Documents and reports from internal sources were
collected through personal visits to the respective institutions and organisations in Nigeria, followed by interviews.
Three sets of interviews were conducted in Nigeria in 2011, 2012 and 2013. The interviews were open-ended, focusing on
the privatisation of SOEs in general and the role of accounting and accountants in particular. They were conducted with one
or two representatives of each institution or organisation.6 Views were sought from the respondents on whether the
promises of the World Bank and the Nigerian government had actually been delivered: that, with the enlistment of
accounting, privatisation would reduce public-sector corruption, enhance accountability and market efﬁciency, generate
investment and create employment opportunities in Nigeria. The respondents included chairmen of the National Assembly
Committees, representatives of the BPE, the Ofﬁce of the Auditor-General for the Federation, members of civil society
organisations, including a human rights lawyer, and other Nigerians. The interviews were conducted in the interviewees’
ofﬁces in Nigeria. Each interview lasted about an hour and was tape-recorded, transcribed and thematically analysed.
Data from external sources comprised documents and reports from international organisations and professional
accountancy bodies7, as well as the reports of civil society organisations, such as Human Rights Watch. These reports
sometimes problematised the ofﬁcial versions of privatisation cases by the Nigerian government. Documents and reports
from external sources were collected mainly from the websites of the respective institutions and organisations.
4. Socio-political context of accounting and cronyism
Understanding the socio-political atmosphere of a society or organisation is akin to understanding the functioning and
practice of professions such as accounting in that society (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2013). Nigeria is theworld’s sixth largest
producer of petroleum, which accounts for almost 90 per cent of the country’s annual revenue (Ogunde, 2012). However, the
country’s post-colonial dynamics of cronyism, unreformed institutions and corruption appear to have had implications for
the practice of accounting (Bakre, 2011). This has further impacted on the management of its huge oil revenues and of SOEs,
into which millions of dollars are being pumped annually but with unequal wealth redistribution (see African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2008; Senate Committee on Petroleum Trust Development Fund, 2007). Problems in the oil- and gas-rich
Nigerian economy started as a result of the crash in international oil prices in the early 1980s. This was the beginning of a
period in which Nigeria became unable to sustain the millions of dollars of oil revenue being pumped into its mismanaged
SOEs. The annual proﬁts of these enterprises plummeted as a result of accounting practices used by politicians and2 These included minutes of meetings and publications of the National Council on Privatization (NCP), the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), the
igerian Stock Exchange, the Federal Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Federal Ministry of Information and the Corporate Affairs Commission.
3 These included the Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Privatization and Commercialization, the Senate Committee on Privatization and Other Matters, the
enate Committee on Communication and Related Matters, the Senate Committee on Petroleum Trust Development Fund, the Senate Committee on
viation, the House of Representatives Committee on Privatization and Commercialization, the House of Representatives Committee on Power and Energy
nd the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, as well as minutes of meetings of the Federal Executive Council on Privatization.
4 Such as the Ofﬁce of the Accountant-General of the Federation, which is constitutionally empowered to ensure accountability in the revenue accruing
rom the sale of national assets; local and national representatives of the Big Four accounting ﬁrms operating in Nigeria; and the two Nigerian professiona
ccounting bodies, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN).
5 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB)
6 The National Council on Privatization; two arms of the National Assembly (the Senate and the House of Representatives Committee on Privatization)
igerian professional bodies, ICAN and ANAN; the legal profession; and the academic community.
7 Such as the World Bank, World Bank International Development Fund, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank, International Consortium o
overnmental Financial Management, the United Nations, PricewaterhouseCoopers and other members of the Big Four accounting ﬁrms.
Please cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
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Another accountability problem was the use of accounting practices to harbour cronyism in the diversion of a huge
proportion of oil and gas revenues into private bank accounts (see Bakre, 2006; Global Financial Integrity, 2013; Senate
Committee on Petroleum Trust Development Fund, 2007). A Global Financial Integrity (2013) estimated that Nigeria lost
$18 billion annually to corruption and the ﬂight of capital. Transparency International (2014) rankedNigeria at 136 out of the
world’s 176 most corrupt countries, with a score of just 27 out of 100. Despite its huge oil and gas resources, the country
remains one of the poorest in the world (Transparency International, 2014). Given the draining of its huge oil and gas
revenues by corruption, in recent years the country has increasingly recognised an urgent need for international capital. In
approaching the World Bank for ﬁnancial assistance, Nigeria was encouraged to embark on privatisation of its SOEs. It was
persuaded that accounting would help to reduce public-sector corruption in the process by creating accountability, thus
removing amajor impediment to economic development, andwould create international investor conﬁdence in theNigerian
capital market (see Hegarty, 2007). However, in view of the country’s crony socio-political system and culture of impunity,
there has been a tendency for accounting to be used to conceal cronyism in privatisation, thereby increasing corruption (see
Bakre, 2006, 2007).
In order for Nigeria to continue to be considered for World Bank loans, Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No.
25 of 1988 was passed. A Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC) was constituted, with a
mandate to privatise 111 SOEs and commercialise 34 others. In 1993, the TCPC concluded its assignment and submitted a
ﬁnal accounting report, which suggested that the privatisation of 88 out of the 111 SOEs listed in the decree had beenmarred
by the use of accounting techniques to conceal cronyism and corruption in their valuation and sale (see Senate Committee on
Aviation Report, 2002). Nevertheless, based on the recommendations of the TCPC, the military government passed the
Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) Decree No. 28 of 1993, which repealed the 1988 decree and established the BPE to
continue the implementation of privatisation.
In May 1999, when Nigeria returned to democracy, the statement of accounts from the previous military administration
up to May 1999 showed the total amount borrowed from IFIs and invested in SOEs to be over $10 billion (see DMO, 2001).
Further reports suggest that accounting techniques and practices were implicated in the mismanagement, scrapping,
valuation and eventual selling of some SOEs to cronies at giveaway prices (Senate Committee on Aviation Report, 2002). This
situation resulted in foreign debts of over $20 billion for Nigerian taxpayers (see DMO, 2001). The consequence was a
reduction in the provision of public utilities, as some revenues from the sale of oil and gas were being directed towards
servicing debt (see AFRODAD, 2007).
The new democratic government had to approach the World Bank for further ﬁnancial assistance. The World Bank’s
responsewas that Nigeria should consider adopting IFRSs and use the expertise of accountants to continue privatising SOEs.
With a commitment to adopting IFRSs, the Nigerian government enacted the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and
Commercialisation) Act (PEPCA) 1999. This Act created the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) under the chairmanship
of the Vice-President,with amandate to privatisemanymore SOEs. However, in the crony capitalist Nigerian state,where the
political system often seems to reward corruption (Joseph, 1987), any legal support to enlist accounting to privatise
additional SOEs might mean using accounting practices to legitimise and increase corruption in the process. This appears to
have been the situation in most SOEs privatised since 1999. This paper examines a case study of Nigerian External
Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) and its mobile subsidiary MTEL, in which accounting appears to have obscured
cronyism and corruption in their valuation, with three aborted sales and a fourth sale currently under investigation.
5. Analysis of the empirical evidence
This section examines accounting and cronyism in the sale of NITEL/MTEL to external investors (Section 5.1), the sale of
NITEL/MTEL to an internal investor (Section 5.2), the proceeds of privatisation (Section 5.3), and post-privatisation
performance (Section 5.4).
5.1. Accounting, cronyism and the sale of NITEL/MTEL to external investors
Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET) was initially largely a commercial venture, established in 1962 by the
Nigerian government in partnership with Cable and Wireless. It was not until 1972, after the government had gained total
control of NET, that thewords “limited liability company”were added to the ﬁrm’s title. Theﬁrmprovided an efﬁcient service
for much of the 1960s and 1970s. However, by the beginning of the 1980s, the ﬁrmwas experiencing operational difﬁculties,
notably delinquent payments, undocumented inventories, faulty billings and an inability to reconcile its debt and customers’
accounts. These difﬁculties were brought about by ineffective accounting practices that hampered the effective monitoring
and control of its ﬁnancial activities (Elombah, 2003; Senate Committee on Aviation Report, 2002). These issues led to a lack
of accountability, and corruption (Mahmoud, 2006; Senate Committee on Aviation Report, 2002). In 1985, the military
administration created NITEL, merging the telecommunications unit of Post & Telegraphy (P&T) with NET, while the postal
unit of P&T became NIPOST. The new company introduced a more commercial strategy, using cost accounting techniques to
implement a controversial staff rationalisation plan, trimming theworkforce from about 26,000 to amoremanageable level.
Willmott and Sikka(1997, p.838) note that “accounting numbers and techniques have been used to promote the competitive
tendering of services and have played a key role in prompting or legitimising rationalisation of public services”. By utilisingPlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2016.01.003
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demand, while the quality of service did not improve. In 1988, the military government used Decree No. 25 of 1988 and
accounting for proﬁt and loss to push for the commercialisation of NITEL under the Technical Committee on Privatization and
Commercialization. However, successive military governments mobilised accounting to conceal cronyism and subvert
accountability in the undervaluation and sale of most assets at giveaway prices to cronies (Senate Committee on Aviation
Report, 2002).
On the country’s return to democracy in 1999, the new government incorporated MTEL as a mobile phone subsidiary of
NITEL and prepared NITEL/MTEL for privatisation. In implementing market reform policies such as privatisation, aid
dependent developing countries had to meet demands from rich foreign governments, donor agencies and international
ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs), notably theWorld Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their Structural Adjustment
Programs (SAPs) (Annisette, 2004; Neu, Gomez, Graham, & Heincke, 2006). Rich foreign governments, donor agencies and
IFIs largely exert considerable inﬂuence over development policies in developing countries (Andrew, 2013), in which
accounting was integral to their implementation (Hopper, Tsamenyi, Uddin, & Wickramasinghe, 2009). In privatisation for
example, the International Consortium of Governmental Financial Management (1997) noted that:
the valuation of the assets to be privatised is important for the government tomaintain its credibility in the privatisation process
and achieve an appropriate sales price. Increased accounting and auditing scrutiny should help promote the transparency and
accountability of the valuation exercises.
Iyoha & Oyerinde (2010, p.362) note that “in countries lacking a ‘modern’ government accounting system, it is invariably
(and reasonably) assumed that they need one to secure ‘good governance’, sound public ﬁnancial management and
accountability”. Rahaman (2010, p.425) observes that:
[Rich countries] . . . through their control of global agencies such as the World Bank and IMF . . . have provided de facto
ﬁnancial governance inmost sub-Saharan African countries . . . [T]hese agencies [through] . . . ‘conditionalities’ . . . promote
particular technologies of government such as accounting and auditing.
Having adopted accounting-conditioned privatisation in order to be considered for more loans from IFIs, particularly the
World Bank, in 2001, the Nigerian government mobilised fair value accounting to value and legitimise the market price of
NITEL/MTEL at between $1.3 billion and $2 billion. After the valuation, Investment International London Limited offered to
buymore than half of NITEL/MTEL’s equity for $1.25 billion. Thewinning bidder put up a 10 per cent deposit ﬁnanced by First
Bank Nigeria PLC, but was unable to pay the remaining 90 per cent within the agreed time period, thus nullifying the sale
(Senate Committee on Privatization and Other Related Matters, 2008). Without making the subsequent bidding process
public, as statutorily required, the agency concerned with privatisation (BPE) claimed that, having emerged as the highest
bidder in 2002, Pentascope had bought NITEL/MTEL, with an agreement that it must make $502 million within one year.
However, barely sixmonths after acquiring NITEL/MTEL, Pentascope utilised NITEL/MTEL accounting information to obtain a
$341 million loan from the Nigerian banking sector, using the assets of NITEL/MTEL as collateral, as well as around
$110 million in Treasury bills. Nevertheless, Pentascope was unable to make the required $502 million during the period
agreed ([187_TD$DIFF]Senate Committee on Communication Report, 2008), and as a result of this default the government reversed the sale.
While widespread Nigerian opinion suggested that the Nigerian government should not privatise NITEL/MTEL after two
failed attempts, the World Bank continued to reassure the Nigerian government that privatisation was still the most viable
alternative for the efﬁcient management of the company (seeWorld Bank, 2004). Cook and Kirkpatrick (1997) note that “the
World Bank, IMF and donors such as USAID were accused of ignoring local resistance to privatisation, employing inadequate
ﬁnancial systems for equity sales, ignoring local needs, neglecting adequate regulation, and casting aside inconclusive
evidence that private enterprises outperform state ones”. As the Nigerian government would probably require more loans
from IFIs, particularly the World Bank, it had to convince Nigerians who were sceptical of neoliberalism that privatisation
was the only viable alternative economic policy for NITEL/MTEL to operate efﬁciently. As a result, the Nigerian government
prepared NITEL/MTEL for further privatisation. Harvey (2005) notes that “in the global neoliberal market characterised by
the survival of the ﬁttest, domestic politics and economic policies often conﬂict with neoliberal politics and economic
policies”.
Therefore, in order to invite bidding from new prospective investors, the government sought to establish the net worth of
NITEL/MTEL through an audit of the ﬁnancial statements. Shaoul (1997, p.382) notes that “accounting provides the
framework for the proﬁt and loss game and accounting techniques were employed for the crucial task of restructuring the
nationalised industries as commercially viable enterprises in the private sector”. In 2005, using accounting to restructure,
value and prepareNITEL/MTEL for sale, the audited accounts of NITEL/MTEL showed that a once-thriving national operator in
2002 had become amismanaged, unproﬁtable organisation seethingwith corruption, inefﬁciency and technical deﬁciencies
(BPE, 2009). NITEL’s number of ﬁxed lines had fallen dramatically from 553,471 functional lines in 2002 to about 100,000 by
September 2005, while subscribers to its mobile phone subsidiary, MTEL, had also fallen, from 1.3 million in 2002 to a few
thousand in September 2005. Total revenues had dropped from $452million in 2002 to $193million in September 2005. The
income statement showed that the pre-tax income of NITEL/MTEL had declined from $127million in 2002 to $10.7million in
September 2005, while the balance sheet showed that its liabilities had risen from $624 million in 2002 to $1.1 billion in
September 2005. Consequently, NITEL/MTEL, with 100 per cent equity valued at between $1.3 billion and $2 billion in 2001,
was valued at between $555 million and $855 million in 2005. The above accounting numbers and information becamePlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2016.01.003
O.M. Bakre, S. Lauwo / Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (2015) xxx–xxx 7
G Model
YCPAC 1940 No. of Pages 14another legitimate instrument at the disposal of the World Bank to buttress its earlier encouragement of the Nigerian
government. It re-afﬁrmed that, in the management of NITEL/MTEL, privatisation was the only viable alternative economic
policy to reduce public-sector corruption and enhance accountability and market efﬁciency. Bauman (2007) notes that:
where robbing whole nations of their resources is called “promotion of free trade”, robbing whole families and communities of
their means of livelihood is called “downsizing” or just “rationalisation” and neither of the two has been ever listed among
criminal and punishable deeds, other exploitative neo-liberal economic policies, such as privatisation will continue to be
celebrated as the only viable alternative economic policy globally.
Fukuyama (2005) argues that:
in a crony capitalist state, any encouragement to adopt a new economic policy to ﬁght public sector corruption and inefﬁciency
in the management of SOEs, often become[s] an opportunity for a network of social actors in cronyism to use the policy to
continue to build their regime of private capital.
Thus, the World Bank’s encouragement for Nigeria to privatise NITEL/MTEL appears to have turned into an opportunity
for internal actors to use accounting practices to mask cronyism and corruption in the undervaluation and cheap sale of
NITEL/MTEL to an internal investor – Transcorp – a local company in which the Nigerian president allegedly had a vested
interest.
5.2. Accounting, cronyism and the sale of NITEL/MTEL to an internal investor
The Transnational Corporation of Nigeria PLC, or Transcorp, was incorporated on 16 November 2004 with the goal of
creating a globally competitive Nigerian company. The original concept was that Transcorpwould be a conglomerate similar
to a South Korean “chaebol”. The goal of the founders was to establish a company capable of mobilising local and
international capital in the development of world-class enterprises, under strong Nigerian management and leadership.
Transcorp is a diversiﬁed conglomerate with strategic investments and core interests in the hospitality, agribusiness and
energy sectors. It is publicly quoted, with a diverse shareholder base of about 290,000 investors, the most prominent of
which is Heirs Holdings Limited, a pan-African property investment company. In 2006, when the government decided to
resell NITEL/MTEL, Transcorp became a strong contender in the purchase.
In order to prepareNITEL/MTEL for its third sale, BPE had to value its assets to ascertain its currentmarket value. Using fair
value accounting, NITEL/MTEL was valued at between $339 million and $704 million in 2006, a considerable drop from the
valuation of between $1.3 billion and $2 billion in 2001. Following this valuation, NITEL/MTEL was sold to Transcorp at a
paltry $500 million. Nellis (2008) observes that “the privatisation process has been marked by enormous abuses: in crony
capitalist countries, a few powerful and inﬂuential individuals managed to grab hold of previous SOEs for a pittance and
become millionaires or billionaires”. On investigation, the Senate Committee on Privatization and Other Related Matters
(2008) suggested that the President might have inﬂuenced BPE to mobilise fair value accounting and other accounting
practices in order to obscure cronyism and corruption in the undervaluation and ﬁre-sale price of NITEL/MTEL to Transcorp.
Responding to such concerns from the Senate Committee, a human rights lawyer was interviewed for this study. Hewas ﬁrst
asked whether he believed that fair value accountingmight have produced a rational and unbiased estimate of the potential
market price of NITEL/MTEL. His response was:
the valuation of NITEL/MTEL no doubt tome reﬂects the impact of corruption in Nigeria. How could anyaccountant explain that,
in a poor country where assets often appreciate, the so called fair value accounting would be used to depreciate NITEL/MTEL to
such a ridiculously low price? I think this is the work of a powerful elite using the legitimacy of accounting to conﬁscate the
collective wealth of Nigerians at a pittance.
Ezzamel and Lilley (2004) note that “as a technology of legitimacy of economic activities, accounting is often used to
depict reality as well as alter it”. Without the approval of the National Assembly as constitutionally required, the Nigerian
president inﬂuenced accounting practices to enable the withdrawal of $1.3 million from the public treasury to buy shares in
Transcorp on behalf of Obasanjo Holdings, his private company (see Senate Committee on Petroleum Trust Development
Fund, 2007). Cammack (2007, p.601) notes that:
African leaders are contentwith an institutional environmentwhere transparency, accountability, and formal controls areweak
or absent, preferring instead to use public ﬁnances and the input of aid and windfall proﬁts . . . to ‘grease’ the clientelist
machine
Further investigation by the Senate Committee found that this withdrawal was unconstitutional, a conﬂict of interest and
an abuse of the president’s ofﬁce. Nye (1967) notes that:
in a crony capitalist system, royal rulers were not subject to any signiﬁcant constitutional rules that limited their choice of
alternative techniques for achieving personal and state goals. The King used the state money to meet his private commitments, the
costs of military campaigns, just as contemporary parties use ﬁnancial contributions and sometimes state money to meet the costs
of electioneering campaigns.
In an interview for this study, a representative of Obasanjo Holdings insisted that “there was no conﬂict of interest
because the president’s Transcorp shares were held in a blind trust”. According to Sikka (2006), “a US Treasury reportPlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2016.01.003
8 O.M. Bakre, S. Lauwo / Critical Perspectives on Accounting xxx (2015) xxx–xxx
G Model
YCPAC 1940 No. of Pages 14observed that trusts are key vehicles for disguising shady business deals and illicit funds; there is no regulation, registration
or public accountability of trusts in the UK and it is impossible to know their beneﬁciaries”. Ojakaminor (2007) states that:
what has become clear to Nigerians is that Transcorp serves as the opposite arm of the BPE. Thus, while the BPE acts as the sole
seller of government enterprises, Transcorp is positioned as the sole buyer. Both enterprises have already concluded deals with
respect to the Hilton Hotel, Le Meridien, NITEL/MTEL, oil companies and will no doubt conclude several others on offer now and
in the future.
As Transcorp was said also to have failed in meeting its legal obligations under the 2006 sale agreement, the government
had to reverse this sale. On 18 December 2014, the National Council on Privatization announced a fourth sale of NITEL/MTEL,
to NATCOM Consortium, for a paltry $252.25 million, a sale that is currently being investigated on suspicion that accounting
may have concealed cronyism and corruption in the process to short-change Nigerians. While accounting may thus have
obscured cronyism and corruption in the valuation and sale of NITEL/MTEL, it appears also to have masked the diversion of a
huge portion of the proceeds of privatisation into private bank accounts.
5.3. Accounting, cronyism and the proceeds of privatisation
Shaoul (1997, p.382) notes that:
since an accounting model working with publicly available corporate data can be used to make an objective social analysis and
critique of economic life, accounting and auditing supported by an extensive legal framework of ﬁnancial measurement,
reporting and disclosure plays an important role in executing a sound privatisation process.
Recognising the role of accounting and auditing in a sound privatisation process, Section 19(1) of PEPCA 1999 speciﬁcally
authorised the Ofﬁce of the Accountant-General of the Federation (OAGF) to use the services of reputable accounting ﬁrms to
liquidate national assets prepared for privatisation. It further ordered the OAGF to utilise fair value accounting to determine
their real market value and sell them under a competitive bidding process. It charged the OAGF to deposit all proceeds of
privatisation into the Privatisation Proceeds Account of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN PPA). PEPCA 1999 alsomandated the
Ofﬁce of the Auditor-General for the Federation (OAUGF) to carry out periodic audits of the CBN PPA. However, the current
investigation has found that, whilst fair value accounting may have been used to mask cronyism in the undervaluation of
assets, which further legitimised their ﬁre-sale prices to cronies, the OAGF also opened accounts in eight commercial banks,
against statutory provision.Moreover, substantial amounts of the proceeds of the sales of public assets could not be traced to
the CBN PPA or accounted for by the OAGF or the OAUGF (Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, 2008;
Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Privatization, 2011). Neither was there any internal control or qualiﬁed audit report on the
missing amount to show that proper accounting, auditing and accountability systems actually played a vital role in Nigerian
privatisation. Schwartz (2003) suggests that “clear mandates, legal protections, ample resources, investigative powers, and
information-sharing mechanisms are all required if supreme audit institutions are to succeed in helping ﬁght corruption”.
Evenwith these powers, it is difﬁcult for auditors to free themselves of the cultural and social context inwhich they operate
(Neu et al., 2013). This appears to be the case in the crony capitalist Nigerian state, where the available evidence in both
corporate and private sectors suggests a need to audit the auditors themselves (see Bakre, 2007).
For example, during the 2011 investigation by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee into some allegedmalpractices in the sale of
national assets, the statement of accountsmade available by BPE to the Senate AdHoc Committee, estimated the value of the
400 national assets privatised since 1999 at over $14 billion. In comparison, the statement of accounts made available by the
OAGF to the Senate Ad Hoc Committee showed actual gross earnings of only $3.1 billion. Of that $3.1 billion, only
$936.9 million had actually been remitted to the CBN PPA, leaving $2.1 billion unaccounted for by the OAGF and the OAUGF.
As analysis of the ﬁnancial statements shows, the likely reasons for the $10.9 billion discrepancy between estimated and
actual revenues from the sale of national assets are obvious. Amongst other alleged uses of accounting practices to conceal
possible malpractice in the undervaluation and cheap sales of national assets, the Aluminium Smelter Company of Nigeria
(ASCON)was valued at $3.2 billion but, in an auction in June 2004, a US-based privateﬁrm, BFI Group, offered to buy it for just
$410million. For reasons yet to be explained to Nigerians, BPE later sold the company to a Russian-based company, Rusal, for
a paltry $205 million, resulting in an estimated loss of almost $3 billion. Delta Steel Company Limited (DSCL) was valued at
$1.5 billion but was sold for only $30 million, resulting in the estimated loss of another $1.2 billion. The valuation and sale of
the Nigeria Re-Insurance Company (NRIC) to Global Fleet perhaps made the most extensive use of accounting to obscure
cronyism. NRIC was valued at $33 million, but was sold to Global Fleet for $10 million. After the sale, Global Fleet used only
two of the company’s assets to secure a loan of $273 million from the Union Bank Nigeria PLC, suggesting that cronyism
played a prominent role in the valuation and sale of NRIC to Global Fleet. In this study, an interview was conducted with a
senior auditor in the Ofﬁce of the Auditor-General for the Federation. He was asked to explain how the above ﬁnancial
malpractice could possibly have escaped the detection of the internal control system and even the Auditor-General’s audit.
His response was:
Transactions involving valuation and sale of assets under privatisation are personally supervised by the Accountant-General of
the Federation, who is always an appointee of the President. There is no doubt that these illicit transactions would always be
detected by the internal control system and the Auditor-General’s audit, but the auditors, who may or may not be collaborators
in such deals, do not report it, or otherwise they would pay the price by losing either their job or their life. The former AUGF,Please cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
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was directly implicated in the fraud. With outcry from the public, Obasanjo did not reverse his dismissal. In Nigeria, if you are
not ready to do the bidding of the powers that be or a network of social actors in corruption, you cannot even be appointed into
the “special” ofﬁces of the AGF and AUGF in the ﬁrst place.
Neu et al. (2015) note that “the individual responsible for audit is, more often than not, embedded in the broader political
ﬁeld and might not want to disrupt the status quo”. Studies have shown that government auditors are actually aware of the
normative context (Radcliffe, 1999) and that they work at the discretion of important political actors (see Neu et al., 2013).
Although the World Bank encouraged countries to enlist the expertise of accountants in privatising SOEs, a World Bank
report (Elombah, 2003) noted the complicity of accounting expertise in the lack of accountability in the Nigerian
privatisation process:
. . . due process and rules were being ﬂouted and even ﬁnancial expenditure lacks accountability. There is no proper internal
audit arrangement for the projects; a manual ﬁnancial system was being used; there were major lapses in the retirement of
advances; charges made by the project’s commercial bankers are deemed excessive and inconsistent; interest has not been
credited on a special account balance; expenses that dated back to late 2001 and 2002 were submitted in 2003; expenses were
incurred before no objection was sought from the Bank.
This report expressed serious concerns about the transparency and accountability of some transactions (e.g. NITEL/MTEL)
and the failure to comply consistentlywith privatisation guidelines. These are likely consequences of the use of accounting to
conceal cronyism and corruption in the privatisation process, which appears also to have impacted on the post-privatisation
management and performance of most privatised entities.
5.4. Accounting, cronyism and post-privatisation performance
Just as the role of accounting in the privatisation process has been contested in developed and developing countries (see
Ogden, 1995; Morales et al., 2014; Rahaman et al., 2007), its role in the post-privatisation performance of privatised entities
has also provoked mixed reactions (see Shaoul, 1997; Tsamenyi et al., 2010). Young (1998, p.7) found that:
in some former communist and other developing countries, the beneﬁcial results of privatisation are reﬂected in many areas,
such as increased state revenue, wider access to private investment and capital, improved enterprise performance, greater
choices and prosperity for consumers and employees.
However, Tangri and Mwenda (2001) note that “the post-privatisation performance of most privatised entities in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been engulfed with complex accounting and accountability problems. These problems vary from country
to country as speciﬁc privatisation models attract speciﬁc types of problems.” In Latin America, there have been cases of
private entities using accounting practices for proﬁt making, to the detriment of essential public services (Estache, 2004).
Such practices have made public services more expensive (Mussa, 2002), there has been a failure to invest in infrastructure
(Ereije & Rivas, 2002) and the public workforce has been reduced in the pursuit of short-term beneﬁts (Csaba,1994). In other
developing countries, accounting techniques have been used to replace state monopolies with private monopolies (Mussa,
2002), substitute state corruption for private corruption (Hawley, 2000) and increase the wealth of the rich whilst
aggravating the poverty of the poor (Brett, 1988).
Since 1999, when PEPCA became law in Nigeria, and with BPE having privatised over 400 SOEs, Nigerians have never had
the privilege of transparent and accountable valuations and audits of all privatisation exercises to determine who has sold
what public assets, to whom they have been sold and at what price, nor the performance record of any privatised ﬁrm.
Jerkmakowicz and Jerkmakowicz (1994, p. 28) note that:
valuing a SOE is much more than just determining the ﬁrm’s fair market value. The SOE valuation process and report can
facilitate a company’s transformation, prepare it for survival in competitive markets and build transparency, accountability,
public conﬁdence and support for the new market system.
However, it was not until 10 years after returning to democracy that public pressure forced the Senate and the House of
Representatives Committee on Privatization and Commercialization to carry out their constitutional oversight mandate to
investigate the post-privatisation performance of privatised SOEs in the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. Both committees
found a lack of political, managerial and moral accountability in the post-privatisation management and performance of
most privatised ﬁrms (see House of Representatives Committee on Privatization and Commercialization, 2009; Senate
Committee on Privatization and Commercialization, 2009). Conrad and Sherer (2001, p.515) observe that:
being a social and political process, “accountability” is about perception and power, and it has three aspects: political,
managerial andmoral. Political accountability relates to the expectations of citizens in society, while managerial accountability
is about making managers answerable for the economy, efﬁciency and effectiveness of their performance and moral
accountability is about being answerable for proper conduct.
In the current study, the chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Privatization and Commercialization
was interviewed. He was asked to comment on the alleged failure of accounting to deliver on its promises in the post-
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moribund or were being poorly managed due to the poor capacity of those who bought the companies. Most of the
companies had abandoned the share purchase agreement they hadwith the Nigerian government and had deviated from the
original plan of action. Most of the privatised companies were not creating wealth and generating employment
opportunities for Nigerians as promised. The income statements showed persistent losses, while the balance sheet carried
heavy liabilities.
In another interview, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Privatization said:
Probably due to a lack of corporate reform and institutional capacity, the Nigerian privatisation exercise provided opportunities
for elites whowere close to power to inﬂuence accounting practices to legitimise the undervaluation and giveaway prices of the
SOEs to friends and cronies. Even some of the purchasers appeared to lack solid capital bases or the necessary managerial
experience to manage the privatised entities.
Shkolnikov (2002) observes that “a privatisation process without corporate reforms or institutional capacity usually ends
up happening behind closed doors, among a ‘few’ close to the decision-makers and inﬂuenced by them”. On the basis of the
responses from the chairmen of the two National Assembly Committees, an interview was conducted with the Director-
General of BPE. Hewas asked to shed light on the role of accounting in the post-privatisationmanagement and performance
of privatised entities. He said:
What we found was that the audited accounts of over 400 SOEs privatised since 1999 show that less than 10 of them are
performing well. We are particularly worried that some of the privatised companies now owned by foreigners are defrauding
Nigerians by repatriating their earnings to their countries, while failing to ﬁle statutorily required accounting returns to the
Nigerian government. Thus, instead of reducing corruption, accounting may have been aiding corruption in the privatised
entities.
The rhetoric that accounting would also enable privatisation to attract investment into Nigeria appears to be at variance
with reality. For example, the Nigerian Stock Exchange (Business Day, 2015) reported that foreign investors withdrew
$5.28 billion from the Nigerian StockMarket between January andNovember 2014. This ﬁgure represents a 67.5% increase on
the $3.1 billion foreign portfolio investment outﬂow from the stock market during the corresponding period in 2013. The
amount taken out of the market was $1 billion higher than the $4.1 billion brought in by foreign investors. The above
evidence suggests that it may be a fantasy to expect Western accounting practices such as fair value to reduce public-sector
corruption, enhance accountability and market efﬁciency, and ultimately attract capital to a crony capitalist state such as
Nigeria.
6. Fair value and accountability in a crony capitalist developing state: myth or reality?
Proponents of neoliberalism claim that accounting-linked privatisation will help developed as well as poor, crony and
weak capital market economies with weak regulatory frameworks to reduce corruption, as well as enhancing accountability
and market efﬁciency in the privatisation process and the management of privatised entities (World Bank, 2004). However,
the World Bank (2005) notes that:
Most privatisation success stories come from high-income and middle-income countries. Privatisation is easier to launch and
more likely to produce positive results when the company operates in a competitivemarket andwhen the country has amarket-
friendly policy environment and a good capacity to regulate. The poorer the country, the longer the odds against privatisation
producing its anticipated beneﬁts, and themore difﬁcult the process of preparing the terrain for sale. Privatisation cannot in and
of itself make up for a total lack of competition, for weak capital markets, or for the absence of an appropriate regulatory
framework. But where the market is basically competitive, or when a modicum of regulatory capacity is present, private
ownership yields substantial beneﬁts.
This suggests that, for theNigerian economy,with ineffective institutions, poor capacity to regulate and all-encompassing
corruption, fair value accounting-linked privatisationmay not guarantee the anticipated beneﬁts. Thus, rather than creating
accountability and reducing corruption, evidence from Nigerian privatisation suggests that fair value accounting appears to
have increased the lack of accountability and corruption (Senate Ad Hoc Committee on Privatization, 2011). Johnston (2005)
notes that:
The world view and the power behind corruption is the general trend toward liberalisation and privatisation of economic
activity, along with the withdrawal of the state into more limited and technical kinds of functions that has marked global
development for generations. Those changes affect theways people pursue, use, and exchange bothwealth and power and shape
corruption syndromes in critical ways.
Stiglitz (2002) observes that “privatisation policies which resulted in crony capitalism, large businesses managed by
organised crime and a feudal social structure, without a middle class, contributed to bringing about low levels of
development in Sub-Saharan Africa”.
The above observation suggests that, in order to protect Nigerian public interests as mandated by the 1999 Nigerian
Constitution, Nigeria does not need fair value accounting-driven privately-owned enterprises, which are motivated by the
desire for private capital accumulation, inhibit necessary wealth redistribution and aggravate corruption and povertyPlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
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corruption, which stands in the way of socio-economic development. The development of Nigerian industry requires
reformed institutions of governance, accounting and accountability systems relevant to the socio-political, economic and
cultural environment of Nigeria. Developing the Nigerian economy requires extensive partnerships between industry and
state, whereby the latter utilises relevant accounting and accountability systems to provide infrastructure, public utilities,
subsidies, trade protection and tax breaks to support Nigerian industry. This would allow Nigerian companies to become
competitive in the global economy, generating investment and creating employment opportunities for Nigerians. Nigeria
needs to strike a balance between protecting indigenous manufacturing companies and globalising trade. After all, Europe,
the United States, Japan and the four Tigers of Asia (Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan) all rely for their
development on extensive partnerships between industry and state. Their industrialisation processes have involved several
decades of governments using relevant accounting and accountability systems to provide protective trade barriers, subsidies
for domestic industry, support for public utilities and SOEs, and tax breaks and other incentives for research and
development to diversify the country and control currency and capital.
While accounting plays a paramount role in any economic policy, this role is more beneﬁcial when supporting economic
policy relevant to the society or organisation inwhich it operates (Neu et al., 2013). Sikka (2015) notes that, “with the use of
fair value, the faith in competition and pursuit of private interests erodes the space for consideration of fairness andmorality,
as the very notion of success is seen through the lens of markets and economic entrepreneurship”. Francis’s (1990)
suggestion that accounting may serve selﬁshness as easily as the virtue of capitalists became apparent during the
2008 global ﬁnancial crisis, in which fair value was used to pursue private interest, rather than the public interest that
accounting claims to protect. The use ofWestern accounting reforms, such as fair value even becomesmore questionable in a
crony capitalist developing economy such as Nigeria, where governance structures areweak and corruption is a widespread
phenomenon (see Bakre, 2011). Cammack (2007) notes that “when Western accounting reforms hit African governance,
unanticipated and undesired consequences can arise”.
7. Summary and discussion
In the neoliberal context, the liberalisation of economic activity, deregulation ofmarkets, adoption ofWestern accounting
concepts such as fair value, and privatisation of SOEs have been recommended as viable alternative economic policies for
developed as well as poor, crony and weak capital market economies (World Bank, 2005). Western accounting such as fair
value has been presented as a means of reducing public-sector corruption, enhancing accountability in the privatisation
process and boosting market efﬁciency in privatised entities (UNCTAD, 2005). It is also claimed that fair value accounting-
linked privatisation will improve income redistribution and reduce inequalities in access to goods and services by limiting
the opportunities for favouritism and differential ﬁxing of rents that penetrate economies marked by state controls and
subsidies (UNCTAD, 2005). However, Sikka (2015) notes that “everyday accounting practices such as fair value are deeply
implicated in inequitable distribution of income and wealth, a major cause of the economic crisis engulﬁng neoliberal
market reform”. McSweeney (2009) observes that accounting played a role in the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis because, with the use
of fair value, “market valuations of largely opaque composite assets were often wildly overstated”.
In a crony capitalist state, in which the ruling elites are determined to build their regime of private capital but are also
desperate to attract international capital, the virtuous aspirations of accounting have proved difﬁcult to achieve, even
assuming that they and the associated market efﬁciency have been the main objectives of privatisation. Under such
circumstances, fair value and other accounting practices have also played a part in understating the value of assets and in the
giveaway prices of undervalued assets to cronies, thereby denying the state substantial revenue from privatisation. As
politicians and public ofﬁcials have continued to pursue accumulation of private capital in the privatisation process, they
have often relied on fair value and other accounting practices with outcomes that run counter to the supposed aspirations of
providers of capital in the developedworld (Craig, 2007). Through the legitimacy of accounting, these parties thus form hubs
in a network of cronyism,which concentrate economic and political power in small, interlocking, crony capitalist groups. It is
therefore understandable that, despite the claim that accounting promotes accountability andmarket efﬁciency through fair
value, externally encouraged economic policies such as fair value accounting-legitimised privatisation turn out to promote
contradictory outcomes, in which accounting operates on “both sides of the fence”. In effect, the legitimacy conferred on
accounting in the pursuit of external economic policies such as privatisationmaymigrate elsewhere, as accounting practices
are put to use by crony capitalist elite groups to continue to build their regimes of private capital.
Aided by the legitimacy of accounting, politicians and public ofﬁcials belonging to crony capitalist groups have blatantly
violated the provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and PEPCA 1999, which govern the privatisation process (Senate Ad
Hoc Committee on Privatization, 2011). They have done this by using fair value and other accounting practices to conceal
cronyism in the undervaluation of assets, to sell undervalued assets to cronies at rock bottomprices, and to redirect revenues
from the sales into private bank accounts (Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission, 2008; Senate Ad Hoc
Committee on Privatization, 2011). Under such circumstances, according to the United Nations (1993), “auditors are
expected to use accounting and auditing rules and standards to detect and report suspected and conﬁrmed cases of a lack of
accountability and corruption in privatisation to the appropriate authority”. However, where auditors recognise that the
discovery and reporting of certain ﬁndings will have political consequences, they often use their discretion to avoid
investigating, discovering or reporting on potentially problematic actions (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2015). This contributesPlease cite this article in press as: Bakre, O. M., crony capitalist” Nigerian state. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (2016), http://
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YCPAC 1940 No. of Pages 14to the maintenance of “public secrets” (Radcliffe, 2008) concerning politically sensitive topics, such as inﬂuence-peddling
and corruption (Neu et al., 2015). Consequently, there are concerns amongst Nigerians that fair value and other accounting
practices may have legitimised a lack of accountability and corruption in the privatisation process (Elombah, 2003;
Mahmoud, 2006). This has enabled the commonwealth of Nigerians to be transferred to a few elites; further increasing the
unequal wealth redistribution that privatisation was meant to address in Nigeria (Ojakaminor, 2007).
With the techniques of cost accounting, improved efﬁciency, capacity utilisation, productivity, proﬁtability and output,
and a wide range of consumer choices from around 10 well-managed entities out of the 400 privatised since 1999,
privatisation may have improved the welfare of a few Nigerians. However, using the calculative tools of cost accounting,
privatisation has come at a price in the form of high production and distribution costs, and hence higher prices for goods and
services. These prices, computed using cost accounting techniques, are beyond themeans of most poor Nigerians, whowere
used to cheap goods and services under the old state-subsidised production. Accounting practices may also have increased
discontent amongst workers in privatised entities, as rationalisation, downsizing and restructuring carried out with the aid
of accounting (Willmott & Sikka, 1997) have often resulted in workers’ services being terminated. This has often increased
unemployment, which privatisation was also supposed to reduce in Nigeria. Other Nigerian workers have noted that,
although privatisation may have enhanced pay, the increased workload enabled by cost accounting techniques has been
detrimental. These workers complain that calculative tools of accounting appear to have brought insecurity to employees
and weakened their power to organise and bargain over their incomes. Sikka (2003) notes that:
accounting calculations and discourses play amajor role in the determination of wages and taxes. They prioritise the interests of
capital over labour and the state and have systematically eroded labour’s share of the gross domestic product. It is argued that
accounting practices which label payment of wages to labour and payment of taxes to the state as “costs” amplify capitalist
concerns about private appropriation of surpluses and have played a major role in assigning such payments to negative spaces.
While the World Bank claims to have promoted privatisation to enhance accountability and market efﬁciency, Annisette
(2004) notes that “privatisation may have been promoted on account of its strictly economic mandate, and that it may be
because this mandate has been limited to ‘economic’ matters that organisations have not chosen to ﬁght corruption”.
In conclusion, the notion that accounting plays a vital role in economic policies such as privatisation is undeniable.
However, the claim that fair value accounting-linked privatisation will reduce public-sector corruption, enhance
accountability andmarket efﬁciency, and generate investment and employment opportunities in a crony capitalist state such
as Nigeria, appears to be an illusion partly constituted through the legitimacy of fair value accounting.
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